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Abstract
This is the second in a two-part series of papers which re-interprets relativistic length
contraction and time dilation in terms of concepts argued to be more fundamental, broadly
construed to mean: concepts which point to the next paradigm. After refining the concept
of existence to duration of existence in spacetime, this paper introduces a criterion for physi-
cal existence in spacetime and then re-interprets time dilation in terms of the concept of the
abatement of an object’s duration of existence in a given time interval, denoted as ontochronic
abatement. Ontochronic abatement (1) focuses attention on two fundamental spacetime prin-
ciples the significance of which is unappreciated under the current paradigm, (2) clarifies
the state of existence of speed-of-light objects, and (3) leads to the recognition that physical
existence is an equivalence relation by absolute dimensionality. These results may be used
to justify the incorporation of the physics-based study of existence into physics as physical
ontology.
Keywords: Existence criterion, spacetime ontic function, ontochronic abatement, invariance of
ontic value, isodimensionality, ontic equivalence class, areatime, physical ontology
1 Introduction
This is the second in a two-part series of papers which re-interprets relativistic length contraction
and time dilation in terms of concepts argued to be more fundamental, broadly construed to mean:
concepts which point to the next paradigm. The first paper re-conceptualized relativistic length
contraction in terms of dimensional abatement [1], and this paper will re-conceptualize relativistic
time dilation in terms of what I will call ontochronic abatement, to be defined as the abatement of
an object’s duration of existence within a given time interval.
The study of the nature of existence, or ontology, currently falls under metaphysics, a branch
of philosophy [2]. Yet, it obviously impinges on physics in a fundamental way, as physics is at
bottom the study of things that exist in nature. Indeed, physicists talk about the existence of
particles, fields and systems all the time, yet there is currently no definition, or at least a physics-
based criterion, which captures its formal meaning in physics terms. This is the case even though
questions pertaining to physical existence arguably permeate many open problems in fundamental
physics today. For that reason, it is at least plausible that making precise how the concept of
existence connects to established physics might help attain a deeper understanding of nature.
This paper will, after covering some preliminary considerations, propose a criterion that directly
relates the concept of existence to being characterized by a timelike spacetime interval, and then,
using some suitable definitions, examine some of its consequences. Combining these with some of
the consequences of the first paper yields a surprising and remarkable result, namely that physical
existence in spacetime as defined here is an equivalence relation by absolute dimensionality. By
way of conclusion, I will propose that the study of existence based on physics be incorporated into
the field as physical ontology.
∗armin@umich.edu
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2 Refining the Concept of Existence
One could think of a number of different possibilities for defining a criterion for what could intu-
itively be called ‘physical existence’ i.e. existence as applied to physical objects. Examples range
from instrumentalist varieties, like “Something exists if and only if it produces directly observable
effects” to more theory-oriented ones, like “Something exists if and only if it constitutes an ontic
component in the structure of our theories of reality”, and so on. Whatever criteria for existence
in physics terms one might think of, it is probably fair to say that under the presently prevailing
paradigm
• We regard space and time generally if tacitly as the repository for the physical existence of
everything1 (i.e. everything in space and time to which existence applies is everything); and
• We tend to intuitively think of physical existence as a concept with undifferentiated applica-
bility (i.e. existence applies equally to everything)
These assumptions seem so natural that we may not even be fully aware of them. Yet, together
they are bound to render any concept of existence based on them empty of non-trivial physics
content, as they preclude the introduction of distinctions which are physically relevant, important
and finer than than the obvious one between physical existence and physical non-existence.
This potential problem can be addressed by refining the concept of existence first, before putting
it into correspondence with a physics-based criterion. I propose a refinement in two steps. We
should consider
(a) Existence in spacetime rather than just existence per se. There is a rich history
of philosophical debate on what precisely existence means, but as far as I can tell, such
discussions, when they focus on the existence of physical objects, hardly ever explicitly (or
even implicitly) seem to incorporate the central lesson of special relativity: that the arena
of our reality, the repository of our existence, is spacetime. This may be in part because
relativity is more recent than many discussions of and ideas about existence. Nonetheless, if
existence is to be integrated as a physics concept, then whatever criterion for existence one
wishes to consider should take this central lesson into account. That, in turn, addresses the
first of the two above tacit assumptions.
(b) Duration of existence in spacetime rather than just existence in spacetime. As
Euclidean space is completely separate from time, it seems unproblematic to divorce the
concept of existence in that space from any temporal connections. But in spacetime, the
intertwining of time and space permits a richer conception, one in which time plays an integral
role. Thus, if we refine the concept of ‘existence’ to ‘existence in spacetime’, then this opens
the door to incorporating the relationship between existence and time. For example, an
unstable particle which decays after time t1 and an identical one which decays after time
t2 6= t1 might both exist in ‘the same way’ in space, but if we take their difference in duration
of existence into account, we can make an ontic distinction in the four dimensions of spacetime
even for objects that are identical in three-dimensional space.
Existence duration turns the binary concept into a richer spectrum of gradations in which
non-existence in spacetime, for any object that is taken to be physical, is naturally mapped
to the extreme of zero duration of existence in spacetime. In essence, I take duration of
existence to be the spacetime analog of our tacitly Euclidean intuitive concept of existence.
This addresses the second of the above assumptions.
With this refinement, I can now proceed to define a physics-based existence criterion.
3 The Existence Criterion
In general, a good criterion
• captures an intuition about the concept under consideration in a precise manner.
Finding a precise criterion for an informally used concept has been a highly effective means
1Relatively recent speculations like the multiverse notwithstanding
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by which historically progress was made in mathematics and the sciences. It is possible that
the absence of a physics criterion for existence so far is in part due to an unspoken assumption
that it is either useless or impossible to make it precise in physics terms.
• uses previously defined or established terms and concepts. Without this feature, a
criterion should really be considered a primitive concept. One may well consider existence to
be a primitive concept in physics. But if so, then it has thoroughly failed in that function:
primitive concepts are building blocks for definitions, laws and other criteria, but existence
does not seem to have been used as building block for anything in physics so far: as a physics
concept, it has been sterile. It seems therefore far more promising to make existence precise
in terms of already established physics concepts than to use it as a building block for these.
• classifies the entities to which it applies in the appropriate categories to which
they belong. In other words, well-defined criteria do not misclassify things by putting them
in categories in which, by virtue of other considerations, they do not belong. Related to this
concern is that a criterion which is satisfied by everything is useless, for if it is discarded,
nothing changes, as all other relevant distinctions remain.
• has no counter-examples. If counter-examples for a criterion are found, then the criterion
must meet one of two possible fates: Either it must be discarded, or its domain of applicability
must be modified in such a way that the counter-examples lie outside that domain. For
example, the classical definitions of momentum and kinetic energy are left intact despite
their re-definition in special relativity, so long as it is understood that the old definitions
only apply in a non-relativistic regime.
• clarifies the relationship between established concepts in a way that is not possi-
ble in its absence. A good criterion itself adds to our knowledge by helping to understand
how previously understood concepts which seemed unrelated hang together. In the best case
scenario, it unifies concepts which theretofore seemed unrelated.
• points the way toward new or deeper insights or ideas unavailable prior to the
formulation of that criterion The first paper in this series argued that an essential fea-
ture of fundamental concepts is that they point to, or at least hint at, the next paradigm.
Few things could be reasonably considered more fundamental than a criterion for physical
existence, and so this consideration should apply here, if it applies anywhere.
I will now propose the criterion:
Proposition 1. A physical object exists in spacetime if and only if it is characterized by a timelike
spacetime interval.
Since the spacetime interval is proportional to proper time τ and for timelike intervals the propor-
tional proper time is real and positive, this criterion re-interprets real positive proper time τ as
duration of existence observed during a given coordinate time interval.
Notice how this criterion subsumes Lorentz invariance, an aspect of nature that would be reason-
able to incorporate into existence in spacetime. By this criterion, Lorentz invariance is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for existence in spacetime: null intervals are Lorentz invariant but, by
the given definition, fail to signify existence in spacetime. I will address this unfamiliar notion in
detail in section 6.
4 Time Dilation as Ontochronic Abatement
As in the first part of this series, we begin by considering the Lorentz coordinate transformations
of a boost in the standard configuration [3]:
t′B − t′A = γ
(
(tB − tA)− β
c
(xB − xA)
)
x′B − x′A = γ ((xB − xA)− βc (tB − tA))
y′B − y′A = yB − yA
z′B − z′A = zB − zA
(1)
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where γ = 1√
1−β2 is the Lorentz factor, β =
v
c , v is the relative speed between the primed
and unprimed coordinate frames, c is the speed of light, and the primed coordinates belong to
a coordinate frame which is in inertial motion relative to the unprimed frame along the positive
x-axis.
Consider now a clock at rest in the primed frame, which therefore moves at speed v in the unprimed
frame in the direction of the positive x-axis. Suppose that it records time t′A as it passes a clock
at rest in the unprimed frame which records time tA, and then, a short while later, records time
t′B as it passes a second clock at rest in the unprimed frame which records time tB . The distance
between the two clocks in the unprimed frame is xB − xA = βc(tB − tA) which, substituted into
the first line of equation (1) yields
t′B − t′A = γ
(
(tB − tA) (1− β2)
)
=
1
γ
(tB − tA) (2)
As 1γ < 1 for v > 0, we have tB − tA < t′B − t′A, which is the familiar result that a clock observed
in motion will be observed to tick more slowly than a clock which is observed at rest.
Under the special relativistic paradigm, this result is directly a consequence of the invariance of
the laws of physics in different inertial frames and the invariance of the speed of light: If one wants
the laws to “look the same” in all inertial frames and the speed of light to be invariant in all inertial
frames, then measured time intervals must transform according to these equations.
I would like to now propose a different conceptualization of relativistic time dilation, which I will
attempt to demonstrate in the following sections to be more fundamental. Before I do so, I need
to define the relevant terminology for the sake of clarity.
Definition 1. Spacetime Ontic Function: The spacetime ontic function is a map2 ∃S : O→ {0, 1}
where O is the set of all physical objects taken to be within the domain of physics and S ⊂ O is the
subset of O of all objects that physically exist in spacetime. In other words, the spacetime ontic
function is an indicator function which maps physically existing objects to a state of existence or
a state of non-existence in spacetime, coded by the dimensionless numbers 1 and 0, respectively.
Thus, the spacetime ontic value of an object o, symbolized by ∃S(o), can be ∃S(o) = 0, which
signifies that o does not exist in spacetime (but may still exist per se in some other to be specified
sense), or ∃S(o) = 1, which signifies that o exists in spacetime.
Example 1. By the existence criterion, ∃S(o) = 1 if and only if o is characterized by a timelike
spacetime interval.
Note that when the context makes it clear, the “spacetime” qualifier may be omitted. By the
existence criterion, photons, unicorns, pure numbers and qualia all fail to exist in spacetime.
However, it is clear that only the first item in this list is a physical object that falls within the
domain O, and for the purposes of this paper I assume that it is always possible to discern whether
a given object falls within O or not.
Definition 2. Ontochronicity: Ontochronicity is defined as the quality of having a duration of
physical existence.
Example 2. Any object characterized by a timelike spacetime interval is ontochronic in spacetime.
Definition 3. Relative Ontochronicity: Relative ontochronicity is the dimensionless ratio of the
the observed duration of existence of an object compared to that of a reference object, usually the
observer. As a matter of practice, the latter turns out to be what we call coordinate time t.
Example 3. Taking the term ‘having aged’ to be short-hand for ‘having existed over a given
duration’, an object which is observed to have aged the same amount as a spacetime observer
within a given time interval has a relative ontochronicity of 1, while one that is observed to have
aged less relative to the spacetime observer has a relative ontochronicity less than 1.
As defined here, relative ontochronicity is τt , and thus is closely related but not exactly identical
to the inverse of the Lorentz factor, 1γ =
dτ
dt , which gives the rate of aging. For constant velocities,
however, we have dτdt =
τ
t and this paper will only consider constant velocities. It is possible to
use the term ‘relative ontochronicity’ in a looser sense so that it subsumes dτdt in contexts where
velocities are not constant or when gravity is involved.
2The symbol ∃ is borrowed from predicate logic, where it denotes the existential quantifier
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Definition 4. Ontochronic Diminution: Ontochronic diminution is the the decrease of the ob-
served duration of existence of an object in a given time interval by a dimensionless factor in the
open interval (0, 1).
Example 4. Suppose that in an experiment in the standard configuration involving two synchro-
nized clocks at rest in a frame and an inertially moving clock which coincides with one, then the
other, the synchronized clocks show that 10 minutes passed between the two events, whereas 7
minutes passed for the moving clock. The moving clock is therefore observed to have had a lesser
duration of existence during that time interval, and is ontochronically diminished by 0.7.
Definition 5. Ontic Reduction: Ontic reduction is the reduction of the ontic value of an object
to 0.
Example 5. An object which is observed to not age at all over a given time interval t2 − t1 is
ontochronically diminished by a factor of zero, its associated spacetime interval is not timelike and
hence, by virtue of the existence criterion, it is ontically reduced.
Definition 6. Ontochronic Abatement: Ontochronic abatement is a less specific umbrella term
which can either refer to ontochronic diminution or to ontic reduction.
I can now formally state my proposition which re-interprets relativistic time dilation:
Proposition 2. Relativistic time dilation, conceptualized in a more fundamental way, signifies
ontochronic abatement. More specifically, it signifies ontochronic diminution for 0 < v < c and
ontic reduction for v = c.
As we already intuitively consider the duration of existence of anything to be a temporal quantity
that should be measured in its rest frame, we only need to consider the behavior of the proper
time τ of objects observed in moving frames: for v = 0, τ = t; for v > 0, 0 < τ < t; and for v = c,
τ = 0. Thus, I find that the concept of ontochronic abatement is consistent with relativistic time
dilation. But is it more fundamental? In the next several sections I will offer some arguments in
support of an affirmative answer.
5 Four Spacetime Principles
In the first paper of this series, I attempted to show that the re-conceptualization of relativistic
length contraction as dimensional abatement leads to the recognition of the importance of two
fundamental spacetime principles, an invariance principle and a symmetry principle:
Principle 1. The absolute dimensionality of any compact body is invariant under spacetime coor-
dinate transformations.
Principle 2. The dimensionality of every space-like hypersurface of Minkowski spacetime is ev-
erywhere the same.
These two principles have analogs when relativistic time dilation is re-conceptualized as ontochronic
abatement:
Principle 3. The ontic value of any compact body is invariant under spacetime coordinate trans-
formations.
For example, the principle says that if for some object o, ∃S(o) = 1 in one spacetime observer
frame, then ∃S(o) = 1 in all spacetime frames. Surely, it makes sense that whether an object exists
in spacetime or not should not depend on the coordinate system within which it is considered3 (as
long as the dimensionality of the coordinate system does not change).
Minkowski spacetime satisfies a corresponding symmetry for a global property which ensures that
the ontic value of an object does not change in any region of spacetime. I will call this the
homodimensionality of time:
3In quantum field theory, inequivalent representations of the algebra of observables can give rise to different parti-
cle concepts, a phenomenon often associated with Rindler quanta, and an observer undergoing constant acceleration
is predicted to observe blackbody radiation which an unaccelerated observer will fail to observe, a phenomenon
called the Unruh effect. However, as both of these fall within the domain of quantum field theory, they bring their
own set of assumptions and problems outside of special relativity and will be ignored here.
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Principle 4. The dimensionality of every timelike hypersurface of Minkowski spacetime is every-
where the same.
The homodimensionality of time is necessary but not sufficient for the homogeneity of time, whereas
the latter obviously implies the former. Timelike hypersurfaces in Minkowski spacetime are gener-
ally not isotropic, but as homodimensionality does not require isotropy (but not vice versa), it has
no effect on this property of time. The relationships between the four invariance principles can be
represented as in fig 1.
Figure 1: A diagram of the relationships between the four principles
The invariance of absolute dimensionality and that of ontic value are analogous in that they describe
invariance properties of objects in space and time, whereas the homodimensionality of space and
that of time are analogous as descriptions of the symmetry properties of space and time themselves.
The dual relationships relate the invariant property of a compact body in space and time and the
corresponding symmetry of space and time, respectively, which ensures that the invariant property
remains globally invariant.
6 The Ontic Value of Speed-of-Light Objects
I will now address what is doubtlessly the least familiar aspect of the discussion so far, that by the
existence criterion, ∃S(speed-of-light object) = 0. There is a difficulty here in that the standard
interpretation of special relativity makes no direct reference to the concept of existence. Thus, I
cannot refer to definitions of existence within the standard conception of the theory because there
are none. Since I essentially put ∃S(speed-of-light object) = 0 into the existence criterion, I cannot
derive this without it; as with any mathematical framework, one cannot get out what one does not
put in. However, I can attempt to show that special relativity is conceptually consistent with it.
Consider an object characterized by v = c in some spacetime frame. If the existence criterion is
expressed in terms of the equivalent formulation that an object exists in spacetime if and only
if time intervals in its rest frame are greater than zero4, then just assuming the time dilation
formula in (2) without assuming the full Lorentz transformations, and the invariance of ontic value
is enough to deduce the invariance of the speed of light!
To see this, consider that since v = c for an object o in some spacetime observer frame yields
τB − τA = 0 (substituting τ for t on the right side of equation (2)), by the existence criterion we
have ∃S(o) = 0, so the object will in that frame be observed to be ontically reduced. But by the
invariance of ontic value, it must be observed to be ontically reduced in every spacetime frame.
Hence, ∃S(o) = 0 in every spacetime frame, which means 1γ =
√
1− v2c2 = 0 in every such frame,
which means v = c in every such frame.
Since there is, in fact, no spacetime frame in which speed-of-light objects are not observed to
4the purpose of the slight reformulation is that it expresses the existence criterion in language which, unlike the
original formulation, does not already presuppose the full conceptual apparatus of special relativity
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be ontically reduced, this result deserves a stronger interpretation: it is not only the case that
objects associated with v = c are observed to be ontically reduced, but that they intrinsically
are ontically reduced. There are other ‘hints’ in special relativity that speed-of-light objects are
ontically reduced:
• It is impossible for any spacetime observer to transform to the rest frame of
a speed-of-light object. If we already operated under the paradigm that speed-of-light
objects do not exist in spacetime, then surely our first and most obvious justification for
that would be the fact that no spacetime observer can transform to a speed-of-light frame.
If a spacetime observer could transform to such a frame, his ontic value would change, he
would cease to exist in spacetime, and therefore cease to be a spacetime observer! Within
the current paradigm, however, this seems like a mere curiosity of special relativity.
• Objects characterized by v = c cannot by themselves be associated with four-
volumes. The usual method for arriving at a fourvolume, integrating a 3-dimensional region
over a proper time interval, gives a four-volume of zero for speed-of-light objects. Of course,
we can imagine a region of space through which such an object is thought to travel and
integrate over a finite proper time in some spacetime coordinate frame to obtain a four-
volume. But in doing so we have surreptitiously switched frames to that of a timelike observer;
physically it amounts to inserting an object on a timelike curve as an anchor for those
spacetime coordinates. This is illegitimate if we wish to relate exclusively speed-of-light
objects to four-volumes. With only null spacetime intervals, there is no four-volume.
• Speed-of-light objects ‘observe’ their own entire duration of existence in space-
time to be exactly zero. Since a null interval denotes a zero proper time, it implies that
the moment a speed-of-light object comes into existence in spacetime is in the hypothetical
speed-of-light frame the same as the moment it goes out of existence, yielding a zero duration
of existence in spacetime in such a frame.
I addressed the legitimacy of considering the frames of speed-of-light objects in the first pa-
per, where I argued that while spacetime observers cannot describe such objects in terms of
spacetime (i.e. 4-dimensional) coordinate frames, the possibility is left open that such ob-
jects could describe themselves in their “intrinsic space” in terms of 3-dimensional coordinate
frames. I interpreted the non-covariance of coordinate frames in which r = ct as indicating
that dimensional reduction puts them outside the domain of applicability of the Lorentz
transformations. But now there is an even more compelling interpretation: speed-of-light
objects are outside the domain of applicability of spacetime coordinate transformations be-
cause, quite simply, they do not exist in spacetime!
The tendency to dismiss the possibility that speed-of-light objects do not exist in spacetime
or, for that matter, that speed-of-light objects could describe their “intrinsic space" in terms
of a 3-dimensional coordinate frame is a direct consequence of the unspoken assumption
under the current paradigm that spacetime is the repository of everything that physically
exists. If that were true, then it would indeed not make sense to consider 3D-coordinate
frames for speed-of-light objects because then the Lorentz transformations for 3 + 1 space-
time govern the physical coordinate transformations for all objects. But if that assumption
is false, then there are objects which fall outside the domain of applicability of the Lorentz
transformations, and the current paradigm reveals a subtle anthropocentric bias.
In the first paper of this series, I used an analogous set of arguments based on the total length
contraction of speed-of-light objects to argue that they are dimensionally reduced and pointed out
that in the absence of timelike curves, a light cone has a 3-dimensional basis, as in that case the
time direction and the radial direction in space become linearly dependent.
However, since spacelike hypersurfaces are coordinate-dependent whereas ontic value is invariant,
it is incorrect to claim that a speed-of-light object exists in a given spacelike hypersurface. This
seeming difficulty can be resolved by realizing that, by the only available physics criterion for
physical existence, a speed-of light object is ontochronic in the space in which it exists. Yet, the
notion of ontochronicity is inapplicable to spacelike hypersurfaces of spacetime due to the absence
of a constituent time dimension. Hence, speed-of-light objects cannot be said to exist in any
spacelike hypersurfaces.
In what space do speed-of-light objects exist, then? Obviously, the norm of this space cannot be
the spacetime interval because then they would become ontochronic in spacetime. The dimensional
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reduction associated with the speed of light indicates that this space should have only 3 rather
than 4 dimensions. Ontochronicity requires that the space include at least one temporal dimension,
ruling out a (3, 0) space, and by equivalence, also a (0, 3) space. This leaves (2, 1) and (1, 2) spaces,
but these are also equivalent to each other. Thus, there is only one sensible choice: A 2+1 analog
of spacetime which I call areatime [4]. This space has a Lorentzian signature, but with one fewer
spatial component than spacetime. Taking areatime to be the space in which speed-of-light objects
exist, their ontic value in areatime is 1 whereas in spacetime it is 0. The next section will show
that this reflects a key property of physical existence.
7 Physical Existence as an Equivalence Relation
This section presents a fundamental idea about the nature of physical existence. I begin by
observing that combining the invariance and the symmetry principles leads to novel constraints:
• Principles 1 and 3 together couple absolute dimensionality to ontic value. Under
the current paradigm, there is no necessary requirement that the absolute dimensionality of
any object be related to its existence in any space. This can be seen, for example, by the
uncritical acceptance in modern speculative extensions of current theories of notions that
3-dimensional objects could exist in spacetimes with more dimensions than four.
The combination of principles 1 and 3, however, imposes a constraint because absolute di-
mensionality and ontic value are necessarily coupled to each other in exactly the same way
that relativistic length contraction and time dilation are necessarily coupled to each other:
physical objects exist (i.e. are not ontically reduced) in a 4−dimensional spacetime if and
only if they are 3-dimensional (i.e. are not dimensionally reduced). Generalizing this to
n+ 1 dimensional Minkowski spacetimes, this implies that that the only objects which exist
in them are n-dimensional objects. Objects of absolute dimensionality other than n have an
ontic value of 0 in an n+ 1-dimensional spacetime.
This coupling of absolute dimensionality and ontic value does not necessarily hold for het-
erodimensional spacetimes. For instance, if a heterodimensional spacetime is dimensionally
reduced in some region, then ontochronicity could become associated with a different dimen-
sionality of objects inside that region than outside of it. However, the next constraint ensures
that this does not happen.
• Principles 2 and 4 together are equivalent to the isodimensionality of Minkowski
spacetime. Usually, when we define Minkowski spacetime as a mathematical object, we take
it for granted that the definition requires its dimensionality to be everywhere the same, which
is what I have called homodimensionality. In fact, we take it for granted that the definition
requires something even stronger: That even with the same total number of dimensions
everywhere, the combination of time and space dimensions does not change anywhere e.g.
that there are no regions in which the combination changes from 3 + 1 to 2 + 2 or 4 + 0.
I will call the property that disallows this anywhere in spacetime the isodimensionality of
spacetime.
An isodimensional spacetime is always homodimensional, but the reverse is not true, as the
examples just given show. Principles 2 and 4 together imply isodimensionality. Conversely,
requiring isodimensionality of spacetime invokes a combination of principles 2 and 4, which
means that they mutually imply each other:
Homodimensionality of space&Homodimensionality of time ⇔ Isodimensionality of spacetime
(3)
The isodimensionality of Minkowski spacetime ensures that the coupling of absolute dimen-
sionality and ontic value holds everywhere in it. Note that the isodimensionality of Minkowski
spacetime does not necessarily entail that an arbitrary spacetime will also be isodimensional.
Indeed, in general relativity other global symmetries of Minkowski spacetime, such as the
time- and space-translation symmetries, may hold only locally in some models of spacetime.
Perhaps considering violations of principles 2 and 4 can help point toward possible approaches
to better understand outstanding problems in general relativity and cosmology. For instance,
is it possible that the singularities at the center of black holes are regions of different dimen-
sionality? Or that the the big bang took place in a region with different dimensionality than
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that of spacetime? I will, however, not further consider these questions here.
The isodimensionality of Minkowski spacetime implies that any change in its dimensionality or that
of its constituents must be implemented globally (if it were implemented locally, the spacetime
would become non-isodimensional), and the coupling between the absolute dimensionality and
ontic value of each object in spacetime implies that such global change must be accompanied by
a corresponding change in the dimensionality of all objects that physically exist in the spacetime
(otherwise, that would imply that absolute dimensionality and ontic value have become decoupled).
These two implications together directly lead to a most remarkable conclusion:
Physical existence in Minkowski spacetime is an equivalence relation by absolute dimensionality.
It is easy to prove this: An equivalence relation is determined by the properties of reflexivity,
symmetry and transitivity. Consider an n-dimensional object A. By the the coupling of ontic
value to absolute dimensionality, it must exist in an n+1 dimensional Minkowski spacetime region.
By the isodimensionality of Minkowski spacetime, this region is, in fact, all of n + 1 dimensional
spacetime. In particular, A exists in the n+1-dimensional Minkowski spacetime in which it exists.
This proves reflexivity. Now consider an m-dimensional object B. By the same argument as given
for reflexivity, it must exist in an m + 1 dimensional spacetime. Suppose A exists in the same
spacetime as B. This requires that n + 1 = m + 1, and, consequently, that n = m. But that
means B has the same absolute dimensionality as A, and therefore exists in the same spacetime as
A. This proves symmetry. Finally, consider an l-dimensional object C. By the same argument as
given for reflexivity, it must exist in an l+1-dimensional spacetime. Now suppose that B exists in
the same spacetime as C, and that A exists in the same spacetime as B. This requires m+1 = l+1
and n+1 = m+1, respectively, from which it follows that n = m = l, so A has the same absolute
dimensionality as C and therefore exists in the same spacetime as C. This proves transitivity 
It is well known that an equivalence relation on a set gives rise to equivalence classes which
partition that set. The ontic equivalence relation considered here partitions the set of all objects
that physically exist per se into ontic equivalence classes such that for each n + 1 dimensional
Minkowski spacetime, there is a corresponding equivalence class of n-dimensional objects that
physically exist in it (fig 2).
Figure 2: A partition of all physically existing objects into ontic equivalence classes by absolute dimen-
sionality. Each class of n−dimensional objects exists, i.e. has an ontic value of 1, in only the corresponding
n+1 dimensional spacetime. The zero-and four-dimensional cases are shown in dashed lines to reflect the
greater uncertainty associated with these dimensionalities.
The entire discussion in section 6 can now be summarized by saying that speed-of-light objects
belong to a different ontic equivalence class than spacetime objects. Conversely, we can now assign
a fundamental ontic role to rest mass5, namely that it confers membership to the equivalence
class of spacetime objects. More generally, the equivalence relation imposes the constraint that
any physically existing object has an ontic value of 1 in exactly one of the n + 1-dimensional
spacetimes, and an ontic value of 0 in all others. This constraint can be useful as a tool for theory
selection, as it appears that some of the current speculative extensions of established theories in
physics violate it.
5In classical physics, at least. Quantum physics may introduce novel distinctions, see ref
9
8 Conclusion: Ontology as a Branch of Physics
Ontology, the study of being, has been within the purview of philosophy at least since Parmenides[6].
Formulating a physics criterion for existence in terms of timelike spacetime intervals, and re-
interpreting key concepts of special relativity as presented in this 2-part series makes it possible
to use the tools of physics to investigate the concept of existence, at least insofar as it pertains to
physical objects.
It seems sensible to differentiate the study of the existence of physical systems based on the use of
these tools from the rest of ontology, much of which encompasses extraphysical concerns. I propose
the term physical ontology to denote the physics-based study of existence.
A number of problems in fundamental physics can be considered to fall within the purview of
physical ontology. Besides the one area in physics where many researchers have already recognized
the need for an ontological investigation, namely the foundations of quantum mechanics, there are
a diverse number of other subfields of physics and the philosophy of physics that could serve as
subjects of investigation: The ontic nature of physical fields (quantum and classical); of emergence
in physics and related subjects, such as the renormalization group; of infinities in physics, of ob-
jects at the boundaries of theories with different domains of validity, and generally, of phenomena
which we currently do not understand very well, such as dark matter and dark energy. Note that
meta-ontic questions, such as those about the ontic status of the laws of physics, are still part of
philosophy, unless the methods of physics can be applied to them as well.
Because of the extreme fundamentality of the concepts of dimensionality and existence, I believe
that the ideas presented in this series are the gateway for moving our fundamental knowledge of
the physical world into the next paradigm, one in which physical ontology may well be a branch
of physics.
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